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According to press reports, the Senate Appropriations Committee will, in 
response to a request from the Obama Administration, attach a $108 billion 
increase in funding for the International Monetary Fund to a supplemental 
wartime spending bill. This will happen as early as today (Thursday, May 14). 
 
This is a surprise and controversial move, and may succeed in avoiding the 
hearings and debate that would normally accompany such an important 
appropriation. In order to make this politically feasible, the administration 
has argued that the true cost of this $108 billion contribution to the IMF is 
actually zero. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) did not 
accept this argument, but is expected to present a figure that is very low; as 
this goes to press it is reportedly at $5 billion. 
 
This figure is much too low; as will be seen below, while any estimate can 
only be approximate, the basic principles by which such an estimate can be 
derived are relatively straightforward. Such basic principles indicate a much 
higher cost to the Treasury, of at least $16.6 to $26.3 billion. 
 
The argument for scoring it at zero was that the contribution is “an 
exchange of assets” with the IMF. The idea is that the Treasury loans $108 
billion to the IMF, and receives in exchange a corresponding increase in its 
reserve position in the Fund. This argument is not valid, and was correctly 
rejected by the CBO. 
 
The problem is that although the United States theoretically has the right to 
draw on IMF Funds, in case of a balance of payments need, it has not done 
so since the 1970s.  Despite the severity of the current recession, the United 
States has not drawn on IMF funds for decades, and it is extremely unlikely 
that the United States would ever draw on these funds. Therefore, these 
funds should be looked at as a permanent contribution to the Fund, as all 
other contributions for the last three decades have turned out to be. 
 
 
*Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director and David Rosnick is an economist at the Center for Economic and 
Policy Research in Washington, DC. Center for Economic and Policy Research • 2 
To estimate the cost of such a contribution, we must estimate the difference between the 
cost to the U.S. Treasury of borrowing for these funds, and the interest received from the 
IMF.  
 
Figure 1 shows the difference between the interest rate on U.S. Treasuries and the rate paid 
by the IMF on such funds (the Special Drawing Rights or SDR rate), since 2000. The 
average difference is 1.7 percentage points, with 10-year Treasuries averaging 4.5 percent and 
the SDR rate averaging 2.8 percent. 
 
Figure 1 













Sources: International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve. 
 
One approach would be to assume that the spread between the 10-year bond and the SDR 
rate is the same as over the current decade. This is 1.7 percentage points, as noted above. 
However, the cost to the U.S. Treasury of borrowing is somewhat less than the 10-year bond 
rate, because some of its borrowing is short-term. As an approximation of this mix, we can 
assume that half of the borrowing for this IMF appropriation is borrowed short term. The 
short-term (three-month Treasury bill) rate over the decade was 2.9 percent. Thus the 
interest rate for Treasury’s borrowing would be an average of the long and short-term rate, 
or 3.7 percent. (This is an underestimate because the mix of bonds is weighted more toward 
longer maturities.) Center for Economic and Policy Research • 3 
Therefore, the cost of any contribution to the IMF would be the difference between this 
borrowing cost, 3.7 percent, and the 2.8 percent SDR rate, or 0.9 percent. (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1 






High Cost Scenario 
(based on 2000-09 
averages) 
Low-Cost Scenario 
(based on CBO 
long-run projection) 
10-year Treasury Note (%)  4.5  5.6     
Treasury Debt Mix Rate (%)      3.7  5.2 
3-month Treasury Bill (%)  2.9  4.8     
SDR rate (%)  2.8    2.8  4.6 
        
Cost ($billions)      26.3  16.6 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve.  
 
To calculate this sum of these recurring annual costs, we must discount all future annual 
costs. For a nominal discount rate, we can use the Treasury’s cost of borrowing, or 3.7 
percent. Thus, by the standard formula for calculating this stream of costs, the cost of this 
contribution would be 0.9/.037, or 24 percent of the amount contributed. 
 
For the proposed $108 billion contribution, this would be $26.3 billion. 
 
Of course, different estimates may be obtained with different assumptions about future long 
and short-term interest rates.  For example, as a lower bound we can imagine that the spread 
between the Treasury’s borrowing costs and the SDR rate could be as low as the CBO’s 
projected spread between the 10-year bond and the three-month Treasury bill. As shown in 
Table 1, this is 5.6 minus 4.8 or 0.8 percent. Using the same method, we would get 0.8/.052, 
or 15.4 percent. For the proposed $108 billion contribution, this would be a cost of $16.6 
billion. 
 
Thus we would expect a cost to the U.S. Treasury in the range of $16.6 billion to $26.3 
billion.
1 This is much larger than the proposed $5 billion compromise reportedly reached 
between Congress and the Administration.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that this analysis does not take into account any risk of IMF 
default, which the CBO apparently does. Although the IMF has never defaulted before, we 
have not had a world recession this deep during the lifetime of the institution. If we were to 
assume the IMF had a higher risk of default than the U.S. Treasury, this would further raise 
the cost of the IMF contribution.  
                                                 
1 As noted above, the Treasury mix is probably weighted more towards the long-term bonds than our 50% 
assumption, so these amounts would be underestimates of the cost. 